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Grand Strategies in War and Peace. Edited by Paul
Kennedy. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991.
228p. $25.00.
The present volume can be seen as a form of follow-on
study to Kennedy's TheRiseand Fall of the GreatPowers,
seeking to present, elaborate, and apply the concept of
grandstrategyto a set of case studies dealing with great
powers. Kennedy attempts to define and conceptualize
grand strategy in the opening chapter and applies it to
the Americanexperiencein the tenth, and last, chapter.
Threestudies of Britishgrand strategymake up chapters
2-4, followed by five chapters on the "Continental
powers." The latter group varies substantially in time
frame and clarityof focus, with chapters on the Roman
Empire, the decline of imperial Spain, the "military
heritageof modern Germany"across a broad time span,
Francein 1914 and 1940, and the Soviet Union.
Kennedy succinctly notes the purpose of the volume-"to present the readerwith historicalcase studies
of 'grand strategy';that is to say, with assessments of
the success or failure with which various powers of
Europe sought to integrate their overall political, economic, and military aims and thus to preserve their
long-term interests" (p. ix). Unfortunately, this brief
statement of grand strategy (elaboratedin chap. 1) also
provides an idea of the overly ambitioustask assigned to
the volume's centralconcept. I wish to assess the value
to political scientists interested in the study of international relations, and especially internationalconflict, of
this volume by historians (with two exceptions).
The core of such an assessment must be the meaning
and utility of the concept of grand strategy. Following
EdwardMead Earleand LiddellHart, Kennedy presents
grand strategy as a way to relate means to ends: "The
crux of grand strategy lies thereforein policy,that is, in
the capacity of the nation's leaders to bring together all
of the elements, both militaryand non-military,for the
preservationand enhancement of the nation's long-term
(that is, in wartime and peacetime) best interests" (p. 5;
emphasis original)."All of the elements" include the full
use and assessment of diplomacy;questions of national
will, morale, and political culture;and the full range of
economic resources, including industry, finance, manpower, and wealth.
It is obvious that in attempting to deal with this
concept, Kennedy is continuing themes and issues
raised in TheRiseandFallof theGreatPowers.The concept
returns to the linkages between economic resources,
militarycapability,and the costs of defense. It returnsto
questions of diplomacy, resources, and priorities-that
is, the constituent elements of "overstretch,"a central
component in Kennedy's explanation of the process of
great power ascendance and decline.
At the same time, it is also obvious that grand strategy
is related to significant areas of interest to students of
international relations: the meaning and measurement
of power, the role of alliances, the relationshipof power
to military and diplomatic success, the relationship
between domestic and foreign politics, and the relevance of such broad perspectives as realism, rational
choice, and bureaucraticpolitics.
What appear to be strengths of grand strategy, however, are its majorweaknesses. As a concept, what does
grand strategy add to well-established concepts, models, or frameworksin internationalrelations?As noted,
the concept is too broad, tries to do too much, and lacks
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the theoretical guidance of other approaches. Broad
frameworksthat integrate across various levels of analysis exist, for example, in Rosenau's pretheory and in
the geopoliticalwork of the Sproutslinking environment
and environed unit. (These approaches apply particularly to chapters 1, 7, and 8). The considerations of
ends-policies to means-resources is the heart of expected utility and other rationalchoice approaches(from
formal game theoretic work, to Allison's Model I, to
standard realist formulations). Problems of resource
extraction-control over resources-and its consequences for controlover actorsand outcomes are central
to the literature on power and influence (and well
developed in the work of Organski and Kugler). Problems with organizational parochialism and operating
procedures (as seen in the studies on the Roman Empire, Germany, and the Soviet Union) are well handled
by Allison's OrganizationalProcess Model II, especially
as contrasted to the RationalActor Model I.
In sum, while grand strategyappears to be about how
militarypolicy relates to overall governmental domestic
and foreign policy, it does not specify any of the ways in
which these things should be related. It lacks the theoretical specifications that other conceptual models,
frameworks,and formulationsprovide. Indeed, none of
the studies attempts to define or conceptualize grand
strategy. The studies do, however, attempt to approach
their subjects from some broad understanding of grand
strategy. Herein lies the volume's utility;it presents a set
of studies which have moved from what Lijpharthas
called atheoretical case studies to interpretative case
studies and that now have the potential to be used by
the informed reader in the role of either hypothesisgenerating case studies or what Eckstein has called
heuristic case studies.
Universityof SouthCarolina
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A Preponderanceof Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War.By Melvyn P.
Leffler. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992.
689p. $29.95.
A Preponderance
of Powerwill be of immense value to
scholars interested in the grand strategy of the Truman
administration. Leffler has combined a solid grasp of
secondary material with a comprehensive and very
carefully documented analysis of primary sources, including a vast arrayof previously classified documents.
The result is not only a more complete record of U.S.
policymakers'thinking about national securitybut also a
more nuanced and sophisticated reconstructionof their
concerns and objectives.
Lefflerconvincinglyargues that policymakersbelieved
that U.S. national security required "an external environment compatiblewith their domestic vision of a good
society" (p. 13). The lessons drawn from the rise of
fascism, the Depression, and World War II were that
closed economic and political systems were not only
incompatible with "the nation's core values" and the
viability of the U.S. political economy but also created
the potential for military threats that could grow into
global wars of attritionif countries with closed systems
gained control of areas with significant human and
material resources. U.S. policymakersbelieved the Soviet Union created exactly that kind of threat because it

